March 24, 1979: the investigating judge at the Court of Rome Antonio Alebrandi issues arrest warrant against Marco Sarcinelli, Deputy Director General of the Bank of Italy, for private interest and aiding and abetting: Sarcinelli is translated to Regina Coeli, the Roman prison.
Paolo Baffi, Governor of the Bank, co-defendant of Sarcinelli, in consideration of his age (he is 68 years old) is denounced on the loose. The accusations are very heavy: it is the first time that the top management of the Bank of Italy have been accused of criminal offenses and that a very senior manager of the Bank has been arrested.
The fact causes a huge sensation. THE attempts to reconstruct what happened are many and as many are the possible interpretations and in any case attempted in the following years: the financial misadventures of Nino Rovelli and his SIR, those of the brothers Gaetano and Francesco Caltagirone, two Roman builders, and above all the story by Michele Sindona. Such different cases have in common the attitude of absolute rigor of Baffi and Sarcinelli with respect to the attempt to put a stone on what happened in previous years and to compensate with public money the losses suffered by entrepreneurs and bankers accustomed to obtaining everything through strong support. politicians.
To attempt a reconstruction of the events that took place in the now distant 1979, it is therefore necessary to start from the financial events that preceded them.
The management of Italcasse
One of the strongholds, if not the main one, of political power in the credit sector in the 60s, the years of tree was the Italcasse (abbreviation of Credit Institute of the Savings Banks) founded in 1919 to collect the surplus liquidity of the savings banks (once also of the Monti on pledge) and their compulsory reserves, the latter task assigned to all other banks by the Bank of Italy. It was a river of money flowing in to be used for public purposes.
Alongside Italcasse and for the pursuit of the same purposes, IMI (Italian movable institute), established in 1929) operated a credit institution controlled by the Ministry of the Treasury through the Cassa Depositi e Prestiti to support the industrial system and the ICIPU ( Credit institute for public utility works), which with Crediop (credit consortium for public utility works) had the institutional purpose of financing public works.
The weakest link in the system was Italcasse, already in 1956 involved in two alleged bankruptcies, that of Giuseppe MoCeo who with his Minerva Film remained indebted, after the bankruptcy of the company, of many billions, and that of the Roman manufacturer Mario Vaselli, who also went bankrupt with a notable passive.
The Bank of Italy authorized a capital increase (from 89 million to 60 billion) subscribed by the Italian savings banks to cover the losses: a confidential report from the Bank's Supervisory Service seized by the judicial authority in relation to the Vaselli affair, provided for the first time the proof of a financing of Italcasse to a party (the MSI for seventy million) and of open accounts with a liabilities of 900 million that it seems, but the proofs were not reached, were used by the DC.
Giuseppe Arcaini was appointed as new general director (1957), former councilor of the Central Financial Institute (the "financial" of Catholic Action) and undersecretary (Christian Democrat) at the Ministry of the Treasury with the Governments chaired by Scelba, Fanfani, and Segni . In 1966 Edoardo Calleri di Sala, former President of the Turin savings bank, was appointed President of the Institute, involved in the financial disaster of the "Gazzetta del Popolo" (one billion lire at the time of deficit).
The "Arcaini management" did not mark any novelty as regards the criteria for granting loans for more political than economic reasons: from 1965 to 1974, according to some estimates, almost 31 billion lire of the time were disbursed with these criteria: it is certain that as According to a report by the inspectors of the Bank of Italy, 5 billion and a half billion were disbursed without adequate economic reasons, of which one billion and one hundred and forty million went "unequivocally to various political organizations".
Among those who benefited from this management was a Roman builder, Gaetano Caltagirone, in partnership with his brother Francesco: their businesses obtained funding for 210 billion lire of the time of which very few will be recovered after many years. In the early 70s, parliamentary questions began to be presented tending to somehow undermine the political-economic system of power that relied on public credit institutions and on Italcasse in particular.
It was not easy: in July 1977, responding to a question presented to the Chamber of Deputies regarding the granting of credits by Italcasse, the Undersecretary of the Treasury Abis pointed out that the Institute was a private law company, managed according to criteria private companies that excluded the possibility of intervention by the political authorities, a formally unexceptionable statement, and subsequently confirmed by a sentence of the Court of Cassation, but which said nothing about the supervision of the Bank of Italy on the Institute and on the investigation it carried out , with extremely negative results, already three years earlier.
In the end Italcasse lost, according to some estimates, about 1.200 billion, an enormous figure for that time. The general manager Arcaini, at the beginning of 1978 resigned to escape an arrest warrant issued against him.
Funding for the political parties of the parliamentary majority continued.
Five authorizations to proceed against as many belonging to the same parties will be blocked in the following years due to formal defects: Luciano Infelisi, deputy prosecutor of the Republic at the Court of Rome, at the beginning of 1978 opened an investigation into the credit institute, Arcaini, struck by an arrest warrant, made himself untraceable: he died in February 1978 in a villa near Milan where he lived in refuge.
Giampaolo Finardi was appointed general manager of Italcasse, who attempted to rescue the Caltagirone family by making use of a company, the “Flaminia Nuova” owned by people accused of having relations with Mafia men. The attempt is explained by the fact that, according to what Moro wrote in one of his letters from the prison of the "Red Brigades", the succession to Arcaini was decided by Gaetano Caltagirone, in favor of which Franco Evangelisti, undersecretary to the Prime Minister, also intervened during the 1st and 2nd Andreotti Governments (1972-1974).
It is certain that Evangelisti received thirty million from Caltagirone, who had already paid fifteen million to Pecorelli to make him desist from his adverse press campaign on "OP". he turned over to Pecorelli himself on the eve of his assassination (March 20, 1979). In March 1978 Finardi was forced to resign: Sarcinelli, head of credit supervision of the Bank of Italy of which he had become Deputy General Manager, arranged for the receivership of Italcasse. Three commissioners were appointed (Rodolfo De Mattia, Giorgio Calle, Cesare Rossigni) who immediately wrote to Caltagirone inviting him to pay his debts: the answer was an indignant letter.
The debt with Itlacasse will remain unpaid: according to a report presented by the three commissioners on 6 April 1979, the money had ended up directly in the pockets of the Caltagirone brothers. Their company was declared bankrupt, the Caltagirone family managed to avoid arrest, a total of 600 billion in debt and over 100 billion in outstanding taxes will only be partially covered by the sale of the building assets of the myriad of companies created by the fertile imagination of the two builders. It was Sarcinelli who had appointed the commissioners at Italcasse, who in 1978 had ordered an inspection at the credit institute. Governor Baffi had endorsed Sarcinelli's decision. They are facts to be kept in mind for the full understanding of subsequent events.
Nino Rovelli and SIR
It was not only the Caltagirone brothers who benefited from Italcasse's “easy credit” in the 60s. Nino Rovelli, who started out from a small chemical industry (Brill), obtained hundreds of billions of credits from Italcasse and IMI, as well as non-repayable contributions from the State, to give life, through a myriad of small companies, to the construction of chemical plants in Sardinia and, to a lesser extent, in southern Italy.
In a few years Rovelli, linked to a part of the DC (Andreotti and Cossiga: see Ruju) and the PSI (Giacomo Mancini) also became the owner of two Sardinian newspapers ("Nuova Sardegna", "Unione Sarda") tried to climb the " Corriere della Sera (Pansa, Comprati e Venduti; Milan 1977) and even in 1974 to replace Cefis as the Presidency of Montedison, in which it acquired a large shareholding (over eight percent) with money received from ENI through Banca Commerciale of Lugano owned by Rovelli himself (II Globo, 28 September 1974) after having bought the minority stake from a well-known Italian politician (according to some Andreotti).
The oil crisis, with a huge increase in the price of raw materials (six times between 1972 and 1978, while the price of chemical products only increased by one and a half times) and the errors of the National Chemical Plan, considerably oversized in terms of requirements and which nevertheless constituted the formal alibi for the granting of loans, marked the end of the SIR which in 1967 had also absorbed the old Rumianca and had new settlements underway in Sardinia.
Already in 1976 in the PCI conference on chemistry, Giuseppe D'Alema had defined the SIR as the "most sensational case of industrial parasitism". At the beginning of 1977 the magazine "OP" by Mino Pecorelli published an article in which the collapse of the Rovelli Empire was foretold.
A 1977 document signed by CA Ciampi and Luigi Cappugi, a well-known economist of moderate tendencies, supported the need to reduce funding for chemistry, which has now become a bottomless pit of public money.
The investigation by the Deputy Prosecutor Infelisi on Italcasse could not fail to also affect SIR, heavily indebted to the Institute, as well as to IMI and the Sardinian Industrial Credit. In 1975 the company had 1.175 million in annual net turnover against a debt of 934 million in lire at the time, with an annual loss of 309 million: however it continued to obtain public funding "in an anti-cyclical function". In 1977 the Company had properties in operation for 1.050 billion compared to 1.829 billion committed for properties under construction.
On 18 June 1977 at the Mediobanca headquarters there was a meeting of the company's creditors who decided, with the consent of IMI, to reduce the financing plans for chemicals, but the project did not have the support of Rovelli, who absolutely intended to bring when the work begun is completed. It was, to tell the truth, an almost successful attempt: in December 1977 the President of Montedison Giuseppe Medici communicated to Rovelli his entry into the control committee of the company, which meant the official entry of Rovelli, once a producer of shoe polish, one of the great figures of Italian finance. However, it was a bitter joy for the President of SIR the day before the prosecutor Infelisi had opened a judicial investigation into the Company, so much so that some commentators affirmed that, having obtained the victory over Cefis, which in April 1977 had abandoned Montedison, the large Italian capital, Fiat in the lead, no longer had any need for
Rovelli and that the investigation, followed by some interpellations of the Christian Democrat senator of Fanfanian faith, Carollo about the debts of the SIR, was a victory of Fanfani over Andreotti, a well-known friend of Rovelli.
Rovelli, struck by an arrest warrant for fraudulent bankruptcy, fled to Zurich where he died on 30 September 1990.
SIR was not declared bankrupt: IMI, which had invested 50 per cent of its loans in the chemical sector in the company, and the three national interest banks (Credito Italiano, Banca Commerciale, Banco di Roma) formed a consortium in 1979 which assumed the debts of the Company (a total of 3.500 billion lire at the time) subsequently sold to ENI at the symbolic price of one lira, with the agreement that, after three years, the company would be valued to determine the sale price according to its real value. However, this did not happen, the evaluation was not carried out and Rovelli (acquitted in the preliminary investigation of the criminal charges) began, and the
his heirs continued, a legal action against IMI, accused of not having complied with a 1979 convention that provided for the reorganization of the company.
In 1986 the Court of Rome sentenced to compensation for the damage and the sentence was
confirmed by the Court of Appeal and in 1992 by the Court of Cassation. IMI paid 980,3 billion lire to Rovelli's heirs, but the Milan prosecutor's office reopened the case considering that the sentence of the Supreme Court was the result of a bribe of 66,8 billion lire. The related proceeding against lawyers and former judges as well as against Rovelli's son and wife has not yet been finalized with a final judgment.
The Sindona affair
Michele Sindona emerged on the Italian financial horizon in the early 60s, when he became a partner of the private financial bank, a small Milanese bank owned by Ernesto Mozzi and Mino Brughiera, the first stockbroker and former CEO of a large bank. second.
It is Sindona's first real success, a lawyer born in Patti in 1920 and arrived in Milan in 1946 after a brief experience in a Messina law firm. In the years of his youth spent in Sicily, according to some reconstructions, he would have had the opportunity to come into contact with agents of the then OSS (later CIA) in charge of preparing the allied landing on the island: it is certain that in the subsequent events of the banker they appear several times , and perhaps not surprisingly, with leading roles former allied secret agents, from the American Max Corvo, who had worked in Sicily, to the British Jocely Hambro, a banker once a member of the SOE (Special Operations Executive) who from Bern held the contacts with the European Resistance, to Jonh Mc Coffery, a fervent anti-communist Irish Catholic who kept in touch with the partisan leaders in Italy.
It was with the decisive help of the Hambro family that Sindona became co-owner of BPF in 1965 and then, in 1973, the sole owner of it through Fasco, a financial company wholly owned by him.
In 1968 Sindona bought the Banca Unione of the Feltrinelli family: the bank's capital between 1970 and 1971 was raised from 840 to 2.520 million with a participation of sixteen percent of 1.0.R., the Vatican bank.
In 1971, the Sicilian lawyer buys "The Rome Daily American" with Mark Antinucci and US Air Force General Sory Smith, suspected of links with the CIA: it will be the US Senate investigative commission on "covert" operations of the CIA to assert that Sindona had distributed in 1972 111 million received from the CIA to 21 Italian public men of sure anti-communist faith.
In 1969, in fear of the new Italian laws that will also tax the shares of the Italian companies in which the Holy See invested the sums received by the Italian Government at the time of the Lateran Treaty, signed together with the Concordat of 1929, Paul VI ordered to sell the Vatican stakes in the general real estate company, in the water conduits company, one of the largest construction companies in the world, and in Ceramiche Pozzi, a company that is in a very bad economic situation. Sindona, through Massimo Spada, apostolic administrator, who has since been his faithful friend, bought the three companies in 1969.
In 1971 he tried to climb to Bastogi, the "parlor" of Italian capitalism, on whose board of directors all the great exponents of the Italian financial and industrial world sit. The attempt is blocked by Guido Carli, Governor of the Bank of Italy, who refuses to sell the Bastogi shares owned by the Bank's pension fund and calls on public banks to do the same. Thanks to the intervention of the Bank of Italy, which refused the necessary consent, Sindona was also prevented from purchasing the National Bank of Agriculture from the Armenise family. On the other hand, Sindona's attempt to acquire another financial company of undoubted strategic importance such as "La Centrale" for what is becoming an empire succeeds.
However, between February and March 1971 Sindona suffered a severe blow: the Hambro family, for reasons within the family, withdrew their support.
Almost an answer is Sindona's purchase in 1972, according to what he said (Calabrò, "The hands of the mafia") with money paid to him by Roberto Calvi, managing director of Banco Ambrosiano for the sale of Zitrapo, a financial company which held shares in Credito Varesino and Packages, another financial company, as well as pre-emptive rights Invest and Banca Cattolica del Veneto and on the controlling share package of Toro Assicurazioni.
The Calvi-Sindona relations have never been definitively clarified: from partners in many businesses, both members of the P2 Masonic Lodge, they became bitter enemies, who exchanged heavy accusations about the final disaster to which both, each on his own path, went meeting.
What is certain is that at the beginning of the 70s Sindona, through Finambro, controlled a real financial empire, with a myriad of companies set up in tax havens to drain capital in the form of deposits from subsidiaries to invest in the purchase of other financial companies and banks, in a sort of endless spiral. The result was a perennial destabilization of the financial market with illusory increases in stock market prices intended only to attract the capital of small savers.
Solid anchors to guarantee him the necessary freedom of action, in compliance (when there was) only formal compliance with the law were for Sindona the interests at higher than market rates paid to the IRI Banks for the funds deposited in his banks in order to pay with the difference commissions and bribes. Other anchors consisted of close relations, through Massimo Spada, with Vatican finance and the membership of Licio Galli's P2, presented to him in 1974 by Vito Miceli, at that time head of military secret services. Substantial loans to the DC of the Sindona banks were returned only in 1980.
An inspection conducted by the Bank of Italy at the Financial Bank in 1972 ended, despite the disastrous results, in a stalemate. The Bank of Italy did not even apply the foreseen administrative sanctions and transmitted the documents on criminal offenses to the judiciary only in February 1973. In October 1974 an arrest warrant was issued against Sindona, when the financier was already abroad before Geneva and then to Taipei, from where there was no risk of being extradited. On 25 June 1976 he will be sentenced to three years and six months of imprisonment for those crimes.
Until the early 70s Sindona's power seemed limitless: again in 1974, at the request of Andreotti, according to the statements subsequently made by Fanfani to the Parliamentary Commission of Inquiry, he obtained the appointment of Mario Barone as CEO of the Banco di Roma . In reality, the empire was already creaking. In Switzerland, Finabank, used by Sindona for many international transactions, was kept under strict control and in May 1974 the Securities and Exchange Commission suspended FranKlin Nazional Bank from listing. In June, Sindona obtained a loan of 100 million dollars from the Banco di Roma to try to plug the leaks, pledging the majority of the shares of the Banca Unione, into which in 1973 he had merged the private financial bank.
Sindona's attempt to obtain authorization for a Finambro capital increase to procure "fresh money" intended to plug the most dangerous flaws was not followed up by the harsh opposition of Ugo la Malfa, Minister of the Treasury: this did not prevent Sindona to sell the (non-existent) shares of his company as if the capital increase had been authorized, promising their subsequent delivery.
An inspection by the Bank of Italy (July 1974) ascertained the disaster of the Bank which had completely lost its share capital: on 24 September the Italian private bank, which had absorbed the financial private bank, was put into compulsory administrative liquidation and Sindona was reported to judicial authority. On 24 October the deputy prosecutor Guido Viola issued an arrest warrant against Sindona for fraudulent bankruptcy. On 4 October the investigating judge Urbisci issued another arrest warrant for false accounting records, false financial statements and illegal distribution of profits. In 1975 the liquidator Giorgio Ambrosoli, a Milanese lawyer who will pay with his life the scruple used in carrying out the assignment, ascertained a liability of 531 billion, including 17 billion due to 1.0.R., against an asset of 281 billion. In October of the same year Ambrosoli struck the decisive blow in the knowledge of Sindona's financial empire with the seizure at the Finabank of Geneva of the shares of Fasco, the safe of the Sindona. His two German banks (Wolf and Herstatt) were also in trouble, while Franklin had already been sold in 1974 for $ 125 million to a consortium of European banks.
Sindona seemed to ignore what was happening. He refused the sale of his bank to Banco di Roma for the symbolic sum of 1 lira and proposed the foundation of a new bank, the Banca overseas, through which the three banks of IRI (Credito Italiano, Banco di Roma, and Banca Commerciale ) and IMI should have "saved" BPI: the proposal was not followed up by the opposition of the IRI banks
In 1926 Gelli entered the scene: Sindona invited his lawyer, Rodolfo Guzzi to contact him to obtain the necessary help for the rescue. In August two Italian Americans, Paul Rao and Philips Guarino went to Prime Minister Andreotti to request on behalf of the Italian Americans to block Sindona's request for extradition from the United States as the victim of a communist plot and they went then by Gelli to report on the interview.
On September 26, 1976, the Milan Court of Appeal confirmed the insolvency of the Italian private bank for 258 billion and the Court of Cassation rejected Sindona's appeal against the order of the investigating judge who rejected the request for suspension of the criminal action.
In January 1978 Sindona proposed a new BPF bailout plan: Capisce, a Sindona company should have been bought by the Banco di Roma which would have had to pay 40 billion lire to settle disputes with the acquired company. Even this proposal was not followed up.
On May 8, 1978 Ambrosoli presented his second report, in which, among other things, he insisted on Sindona's extradition: it was blocked by a affidavit of 1976 with illustrious signatures
(Carmelo Spagnolo, Chief Prosecutor of the Republic of Rome, Flavio Orlandi, Secretary of the PSDI, Edgardo Sogno, an Italian diplomat suspected of organizing "coups in Italy", Philip Guarino and others) agreed in asking that Sindona be saved from the persecutions of the Communists in Italy.
On July 15, the lawyer Rodolfo Guzzi, a Sindona lawyer, met Andreotti to solicit a favorable solution for his client: the Prime Minister invited him to contact Stammati, at that time Minister of Public Works, former State Accountant and President of Mediobanca.
On 5 September Sarcinelli was received at Palazzo Chigi by Franco Evangelisti, Undersecretary to the Prime Minister whom he had met in Sindona in New York. Evangelisti showed Sarcinelli a series of documents for the "settlement of Sindona's financial situation". Sarcinelli asked to examine the documents to study them, Evangelisti reserved the right to let him know if it was possible to provide them and the next day he let him know that sending "those papers" was no longer necessary.
On 11 January 1979, a new meeting at Palazzo Chigi between Evangelisti and Sarcinelli: there was talk again of the intervention in favor of Sindona of the three banks of national interest but Sarcinelli blocked any attempt at a solution by asking who would have returned the 126 billion to the Bank of Italy that would go to his charge.
The pressure on Ciampi, general manager of the Bank of Italy since 1978, Sarcinelli and Baffi to allow Sindona's "rescue" through the Bank of Italy grew stronger but without results. On March 20, 1979 Sindona was indicted in the United States for the bankruptcy of FranKlin Bank (on March 23, 1980 he was sentenced to 25 years in prison).
In Italy things did not go better for him: after the Ambrosoli-Sarcinelli meeting of 11 January 1979, Ciampi reported to Stammati that the meeting he had requested with the lawyer Guzzi and in the presence of Stammati himself could not have taken place. Sarcinelli had already announced to Ambrosoli that rather than yielding to Sindona's requests he would resign.
On 11 July 1979, the lawyer Ambrosoli was killed in Milan: William J Arico, who came from the United States to commit the crime, was accused of the crime. Arrested on December 8, 1979 while he was robbing a jewelry store, he died on February 10, 1984 while trying to escape from prison. For the murder he had received $ 25.000 in advance and another $ 90.000 later.
The principal had been Sindona and the intermediary in the United States Robert Venetucci, a heroin trafficker (both will be sentenced to life imprisonment in 1986 by the Milan Court of Appeal, conviction confirmed on appeal on March 5, 1987).
After a fake kidnapping in the summer of 1979 by an unspecified "proletarian group" that disguised a clandestine stay in Sicily and his subsequent return to the United States, on 13 October 1985 Sindona was arrested and extradited to Italy. On March 15, 1985, he was sentenced to 15 years in prison for the bankruptcy of BPF, which was followed by a life sentence for the Ambrosoli murder. He will not serve the sentence imposed on him: on March 22, 1986 he will die of poisoning in the Voghera prison, officially by suicide. The liquidation of BPF was concluded in July 1987 with the sale of the residual assets to the Italian Commercial Bank.
The indictment of Baffi and Sarcinelli
When, on March 24, 1979, the investigating judge Alibrandi formally charged Baffi and Sarcinelli, the three commissioners appointed to italcasse were working hard to ascertain the situation, among others, of two excellent "debtors" with solid political friendships (Caltagirone and Rovelli) while, after the meeting of 1 January Ambrosoli-Sarcinelli and the latter's refusal to receive Attorney Guzzi (30 November 1978) Sindona clearly perceives that he cannot count on the Bank of Italy to get out of the blind alley in which he is now expelled.
Neither Baffi nor Sarcinelli were part of that political-business world in which the Sicilian financial and the large creditors of public credit institutions had solid points of reference.
Baffi had become Governor on August 19, 1975, after the resignation of Guido Carli, now worn out in the increasingly difficult work of maintaining balance in a financial system severely tested by the increase in oil prices in the early 70s and by the pressure of the political authorities to avoid social clashes that would have made the political situation even more difficult. Carli, in the name of maintaining political and social balance, had ensured the support of the Bank of Italy, even with considerable financial burdens, every time it was a question of avoiding bankruptcies that would have fatally produced unemployment, even when this meant closing a an eye on the causes of the failures and on the economic validity of industrial initiatives financed by the banking system often only due to political pressure.
Baffi, even if de facto designated by Carli for the office of Governor, immediately seemed unwilling to follow in the footsteps of his predecessor even if, as
happened with Rovelli, he continued to provide loans to those who were already in a difficult financial situation, realizing that there were general interests, such as that of employment in the less economically developed areas of the country such as Sardinia that it was necessary to keep in mind before to determine the bankruptcy of industries (such as SIR) which employed many thousands of people.
Mario Sarcinelli, appointed Deputy General Manager in 1978 with the specific responsibility of supervising the exercise of credit, (General Manager in the same year Carlo Azeglio Ciampi was appointed) was even less inclined to compromise than Baffi, even if, as shown by the his diary, he was well aware of the negative consequences for him that his intransigence could cause him.
According to the assessments expressed both at the time of the indictment and subsequently, it was an act that could have objective reasons in what Andreotti recently called "misunderstandings" between the Bank of Italy and the judiciary (there was specific talk of a refusal by the Bank to deliver to the magistrate the documents of an inspection carried out at the Sardinian Industrial Credit, which had largely financed Rovelli). The key to the reading was eminently political: if not the enemies at least the "non friends" of the ruling political class had been hit. An echo of these types of evaluations is in the diary of Ambrosoli, which reports the comment, not denied, by Mario Barone, very close to Sindona: Sarcinelli's refusal to meet Guzzi had been, according to Barone, the straw that had overflowed the jar.
On 5 April Sarcinelli was placed on bail but on 17 April a subsequent order by the investigating judge Alibrandi suspended him from the office of deputy director of the Bank of Italy.
At the request of Governor Baffi, Prime Minister Andreotti proposed to the Investigating Judge the opportunity to revoke the suspension, specifying that, if re-admitted to service, Sarcinelli would no longer have duties related to credit supervision. On November 6, the preliminary section of the Court of Appeal of Rome ordered Sarcinelli's release for lack of clues. On May 4, 1981, the Investigating Judge revoked Sarcinelli's suspension order: the reason was that, considering the time that had elapsed, the accessory penalty of the suspension risked having a longer duration than the main penalty that "may possibly be inflicted" on the Deputy Director General of the Bank of Italy. Baffi had already resigned in August 1979 as Governor and Lamberto Dini was appointed in his place. Only on 9 June 1981 both Baffi and Sarcinelli were acquitted of all charges.
In a letter to Massimo Riva on 3 March 1983 (Panorama, 11 February 1999) Baffi wrote that he had to realize "the power of the judicial political-business complex that has beaten me".
On July 17, 1984, in the order for indictment of Sindona, prosecutors Giuliano Turone and Gherardo Colombo noted that "Ambrosoli and Sarcinelli had" been able to say a sharp "no" to Sindona "and that the legal case of Baffi and Sarcinelli posed disturbing questions, given the fact that their behaviors were contrary to the interests of P.2 expressed by Calvi and Sindona, just as they were opposed to any solution of their financial adventures in contrast with the public interest and had been the subject of violent attacks by of the weekly "OP" about the story of the loans to SIR di Rovelli.
The two magistrates in their ordinance ordered for these reasons the sending of the ordinance itself and of the relevant documents from the point of view of the Baffi-Sarcinelli affair to the Public Prosecutor's Office at the Court of Appeal of Rome so that it could evaluate "the opportunity to investigate of that story ". The transmission of the documents did not have any follow-up.
In "Panorama" of 13 December 1977 Pietro Craveri wrote that in the affair "The prosecutor of Rome was in fact the legal arm of a political operation conducted by Andreotti ... to protect different business interests that invested SIR, Italcasse, Caltagirone and Sindona ". He was not sued.
After the conclusion of the investigations, Sarcinelli also resigned from the Bank of Italy to hold numerous prestigious positions (Director General of the Treasury, Vice President
of the European Bank, President of the National Labor Bank). For about a year (1987) he was also Minister for Foreign Trade.
Paolo Baffi after his resignation had numerous positions: academic of the Lincei, he was President of the Italian society of economists and in 1981, President of the commission set up by the Minister of the Treasury for the defense of savings from inflation. He died in Rome in 1989.
BOOKS TO CONSULT
- MA Calabrò, The hands of the Mafia, Rome, 1991
- M. De Luca, Sindona, Rome, 1986
- G. Galli, State Affairs, Milan, 1991
- Lombard, Money rigged, Milan, 1980
- S. Malatesta, The Caltagirone army, Milan, 1980
- AS Ori, Bankers and bankers, Milan, 1976
- P. Panerai - M. De Luca, Il crak, Milan, 1975
- F. Pecorelli-R. Sommella, The poisons of “OP”, Milan, 1995
- S. Ruju, The parable of petrochemistry, Rome, 2003
- C. Stajano, A bourgeois hero, Turin, 1991